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They are casting their problems at society. And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are 
individual men and women, and there 
are families. And no government can do 
anything except through people, and 
people must look to themselves first. 
It's our duty to look after ourselves and 
then, also to look after our neighbour. 
Margaret Thatcher, British Prime 
Minister, 1987
As we wrote about in a previous 
Thinker,1 there is something going on 
in Europe which is more than the usual 
back-and-forth between centre-left 
and centre-right parties, something 
more akin to the shift of political 
tectonic plates. We characterised this 
as a hegemonic crisis, a breakdown in 
the consensual hegemony which pulls 
together disparate elements in capitalist 
society into something approaching 
a cohesive society; and suggested 
that this could be seen as the fourth 
such crisis in the history of European 
capitalism. However, assigning names 
and categories may satisfy historical 
analysis but it does little to help the 
immediate questions as to just what 
is going on and where Europe may be 
heading.
The neoliberal hegemony ushered 
in around 1980 drew its social cohesion 
from the idea that freeing up individual 
enterprise within an unfettered market 
system would provide economic 
benefits for all, even if the balance of 
such benefit would flow selectively 
to the most wealthy. It was a lie, 
of course, but it cast its intellectual 
shadow very wide particularly with 
regard to its inevitable worldwide 
dominance. Consider the then British 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, speaking to 
his own party in 2005:
I hear people say we have to 
stop and debate globalisation. 
You might as well debate whether 
Turkey is now home to as many as 3.25 million refugees mostly from 
Syria and it is unclear just how long it can contain the pressure of those 
who want to move on to Europe. In any event, the sealing of borders 
both around and inside the EU produces a kind of existential crisis of fear 
and suspicion which continues to poison much of European politics.
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autumn should follow summer…
The character of this changing 
world is indifferent to traditions. 
Unforgiving of frailty. No respecter 
of past reputations. It has no custom 
and practice. It is replete with 
opportunities, but they only go to 
the swift to adapt, slow to complain, 
open, willing and able to change.
It was this unflinching, almost 
messianic, belief in the inevitable 
dominance of neoliberalism which 
was, indeed remains, its most potent 
force; remains because despite 
the economic catastrophes of the 
aftermath of the financial crisis of 
2008, neoliberalism is still the fallback 
mode of all international institutions 
and many governments, for example 
the newly elected leader of France, 
Emmanuel Macron.
The economic faults of 
neoliberalism, particularly its blind 
faith in unregulated markets, have 
been thoroughly picked over. Its social 
consequences have been less well-
analysed but they are, in some ways, 
even more devastating and pervasive. 
In 2007, a group of British socialists 
produced an analysis of what they saw 
as social crisis in Britain under the title 
Feelbad Britain2 The opening lines of 
this were:
The starting point for this analysis 
of contemporary British society is 
simple: the observation that in an 
era of apparently unprecedented 
overall material prosperity and 
economic stability, people seem 
to feel no better than before and 
quite possibly worse. Obviously 
the “feel-bad factor” affects us all 
in different ways and to different 
degrees, but there is enough of it 
about to suggest a general trend 
across society, amounting to what 
we would characterise as a crisis 
in social relations and others have 
called a “social recession”. We are a 
society of people who don’t appear 
to like themselves or each other very 
much. Twenty-first century Britain, 
our country, is afflicted with a 
deep-seated and widespread social 
malaise.
They went on to characterise various 
aspects of this crisis, for example 
growing rates of mental illness drawing 
particularly on the work of Richard 
Layard:
Layard’s group at the London 
School of Economics observed that 
“crippling depression and chronic 
anxiety are the biggest causes of misery 
in Britain today”, with one in six so 
suffering. This is the view not only of 
this one group. You can tell a lot about 
a society from the health of its children. 
According to another appraisal, there 
are “sharply rising rates of depression 
and behavioural problems among 
under-17s. This year, the British 
Medical Association reported that more 
than 10% of 11- to 16- year-olds have 
a mental disorder sufficiently serious to 
affect their daily lives. At any one time, 
a million children are experiencing 
problems ranging from depression 
to violence and self-harm. What is 
truly sobering is how abruptly these 
problems have arisen. The incidence of 
depression in children was almost flat 
from the 1950s until the ‘70s. A steep 
rise began in that decade, doubling by 
the mid-80s, and doubling again since. 
The rises have affected both sexes and 
all classes, although children in the 
poorest households are three times as 
likely as wealthy ones to be affected.”
In 2016, the British National Health 
Service issued prescriptions for 64.7 
million items of antidepressants, a 
massive 108.5% increase on the 
31 million antidepressants which 
pharmacies dispensed in 2006.
Shortly after Feelbad Britain was 
published, a wider international study, 
The Spirit Level, using cross-sectional 
analysis, highlighted the "pernicious 
effects that inequality has on societies: 
eroding trust, increasing anxiety and 
illness, (and) encouraging excessive 
consumption".3 It showed that for 
each of eleven different health and 
social problems: physical health, 
mental health, drug abuse, education, 
imprisonment, obesity, social mobility, 
trust and community life, violence, 
teenage pregnancies, and child well-
being, outcomes are significantly worse 
in more unequal rich countries.
Trends in inequality vary between 
countries but, in general, throughout 
Europe and America there was a trend 
of decreasing inequality after WWII 
for thirty or so years with a trend of 
increasing inequality thereafter from 
around 1980. The impact that this has 
had on the eleven indicators examined 
by Pickett and Wilkinson across all 
these countries is very hard to sort out 
from all the other factors involved. But 
what The Spirit Level shows is that the 
key ethical underpinning of neoliberal 
dynamics, that greater economic 
inequality is acceptable, indeed 
necessary, as part of a general increase 
in economic wealth, may in fact be a 
driver for increased social problems.
These problems are evident at the 
level of social organisation as much as 
at the level of individuals. Indeed as 
Margaret Thatcher so eloquently and 
truthfully put it in 1987, it is at this level, 
what she called ‘society’, that the key 
destruction reaped by neoliberalism 
takes place. The effective destruction 
of trade unions in many countries is 
the most obvious example of this but 
it extends through to many other areas 
of what Robert Putnam called ‘social 
capital’ in his 2000 book, Bowling 
Alone4 Putnam shows how Americans 
have become increasingly disconnected 
from family, friends, neighbours and 
democratic structures, and warns that 
their stock of 'social capital' – the very 
fabric of connections with each other – 
has plummeted, impoverishing lives and 
communities. This article is focussed on 
Europe but it is clear that many of the 
issues raised by Putnam concerning 
the USA have relevance across here as 
well. In particular, it is hardly necessary 
to draw comparison between the 
‘wildness’ and unpredictability of much 
European politics and the election of 
Donald Trump.
In eastern Europe, 
there has been 
steady increase in 
the importance of 
right-wing nationalist 
governments which 
has led in the case 
of Poland to its 
imposition of controls 
over the press to  
being questioned 
within the EU.
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As much as any other component of 
social organisation, European political 
structures themselves have been 
decimated. Peter Mair’s book, Ruling 
the Void,5 has been cited before in The 
Thinker as the most comprehensive 
analysis of this decline. Its opening 
paragraph sets the stage:
The age of party democracy 
has passed. Although the parties 
themselves remain, they have 
become so disconnected from the 
wider society, and pursue a form 
of competition that is so lacking in 
meaning, that they no longer seem 
capable of sustaining democracy in 
its present form.
Mair catalogues how electoral 
turnout, party membership and general 
participation in political activity have 
all declined throughout Europe and he 
links this decline from the 1980s with 
the decline of wider social organisation:
A tendency to dissipation and 
fragmentation also marks the 
broader organisational environment 
within which the classic mass parties 
used to nest. As workers’ parties, 
or as religious parties, the mass 
organisations in Europe rarely stood 
on their own but constituted just 
the core element within a wider 
and more complex organizational 
network of trade unions, churches 
and so on. Beyond the socialist 
and religious parties, additional 
networks ... combined with political 
organisations to create a generalized 
pattern of social and political 
segmentation that helped root the 
parties in the society and to stabilize 
and distinguish their electorates. 
Over the past thirty years, however, 
these broader networks have been 
breaking up ... With the increasing 
individualization of society, 
traditional collective identities and 
organizational affiliations count 
for less, including those that once 
formed part of party-centred 
networks.
The recent French elections provide 
a clear example of this decay. Initially 
in a Presidential contest, and then in 
succeeding parliamentary contests, a 
virtual unknown, Emmanuel Macron 
won decisive victories first over the 
far-right candidate, Marianne Le Pen, 
and then over all other groups, with 
his newly formed ‘party’ En Marche 
winning 350 out of 577 seats. The most 
humiliating defeat was for the French 
Socialist Party which went down to 
just 29 seats securing only 5.7 per cent 
of the vote. In the 2012 election after 
former president Socialist President 
Hollande came to power, the Socialist 
Party secured 280 seats. Le Pen’s Front 
National was reduced to only 8 seats, 
though its leader, Le Pen, did gain a 
seat in a former coal-mining district 
in northern France. The other left 
group based on the social movement, 
La France Insoumise, led by Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon, also did badly, gaining 
just 17 seats. Macron’s victory was, 
however, gained on the basis of a 
national turnout of only 42%, much 
the lowest of postwar French elections. 
In the Presidential election won by 
Macron, there were 20% abstentions 
and 10% deliberately spoiled voting-
papers.
These elections were dominated 
in part by personalities and in part 
by the popular movements, often led 
by such personalities, which have 
come to replace parties in much 
current European politics. Often called 
‘parties’ these lack most of the normal 
features associated with established 
political parties without much in the 
way of structure or indeed formal 
policies, certainly no clear process for 
the formation of policy nor for the 
election of leaders. They may not in 
fact have members as such; the Party 
for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands 
only has one member, its leader Geert 
Wilders. Le Pen’s Front National, 
usually included in any list of these new 
formations may actually have suffered 
precisely because it did have many of 
the trappings of the traditional party. 
The usual characterisation of these 
groups is that they are ‘populist’, a term 
which is used in widely different ways 
and with little attempt at definition. 
Essentially it means appealing to 
ordinary people and bypassing an 
established political elite. A recent 
attempt to characterise such groups 
has been made by David Goodhart 
in his book The Road to Somewhere: 
The Populist Revolt and the Future of 
Politics. In this he advances the idea of 
new social categories, the Anywheres 
and the Somewheres, and he lists the 
populist groups as follows:
First, the Mainstream: parties that 
can mount a challenge to Anywhere 
liberalism but are most appealing to 
decent populist Somewheres, and 
more mainstream voters generally, 
and do not have roots in the far 
right. These include UKIP in Britain; 
the Five Star Movement in Italy; the 
Danish Peoples’ Party; Alternative 
für Deutschland in Germany; the 
True Finns; and three of the four 
governing parties (as of late 2016) 
in the Visegrad Group (the alliance 
of four Central European states)—
the Law and Justice party in Poland, 
Fidesz in Hungary, and Smer in 
Slovakia (the Czech Republic has 
a populist, and popular, president 
in Milos Zeman but does not 
have a populist government). 
Second, the Anti-Islamists. Hostility 
to Islam is important to most 
European populists but some are 
overwhelmingly driven by it, and 
it has caused some groups to drop 
any traces of anti-semitism (if they 
had them) and often stress their 
support for homosexuality, female 
equality and free speech. Party of 
Freedom in the Netherlands is one 
of these, the Danish People’s Party 
also has a strong anti-Islam focus as 
does Pegida the German-centred 
movement (though it is largely a 
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street movement and attracts violent 
off-shoots). Next are the Reformed 
Far Right: parties which have roots in 
more extreme organisations, in some 
cases even neo-Nazi ones, but have 
reformed substantially and are keen 
to become ‘clean’ (or at least some 
of their factions are). Amongst these 
are the Front National in France, the 
Sweden Democrats, the Austrian 
Freedom Party and Vlaams Belang in 
Belgium. Finally, the Unreformed or 
Barely Reformed Far Right. Many of 
these parties or street movements, 
the unconstitutional populists, are 
overtly racist and white supremacist 
and generally support repatriation 
of non-natives: Jobbik in Hungary, 
Golden Dawn in Greece, Phalange 
in Spain, Kotleba in Slovakia.6
Although published recently in 
2017, Goodhart’s list fails to include the 
two recent French arrivals, En Marche 
and France Insoumise, both of which 
would fit into his first category. He 
also puzzlingly omits Syriza in Greece, 
largely responsible for the destruction 
of Pasok, the Greek Socialist Party, 
perhaps because it has been in power 
in Greece almost long enough to 
be counted as a traditional party. 
Goodhart makes the bold claim that 
“Populism is the new socialism. Almost 
all European populist parties now have 
an overwhelmingly working class voter 
base and most have policies towards 
economics and globalisation that have 
more in common with the left than the 
right, or might better be described as 
statist/protectionist. Indeed, several of 
the big parties – including both UKIP 
and the Front National – have been 
dragged sharply to the left in recent 
years.” 
The one major European country 
which appears to run counter to this 
rise of populist movements is the UK, 
which in the June election saw the 
two major parties, Conservative and 
Labour, win 82.5% of the national vote, 
a percentage increase of 15% since the 
previous election in 2015. Although 
Labour had the greatest share of this 
increase, 9.5%, the Conservatives, 
led by the much-derided Teresa May, 
actually gained 5.5% more of the 
popular vote over 2015. The result of 
this swing under the British first-past-
the-post system was that Labour gained 
30 seats and the Conservatives lost 13, 
the balance being mainly losses by the 
Scottish Nationalists. The result is that 
Britain now has a hung Parliament 
with the Conservatives having no clear 
majority. However, underlying this 
headline are two important factors; 
first that the 15% was achieved by the 
effective destruction of the smaller 
British parties, notably UKIP and the 
Greens. Second, the results showed a 
major shift in the traditional class basis 
of the two parties in England with the 
biggest swings to the Conservatives 
in the constituencies with the biggest 
proportion of working-class voters 
as shown in Fig. 1.7 The shift was 
particularly marked in constituencies 
with a mostly white working class.
Once staunch Labour strongholds 
in old mining districts such as South 
Yorkshire and North East England 
showed swings to the Tories of 15-20% 
with a few actually being won by them. 
It is not unreasonable to compare these 
swings to the gains made by the Front 
National in the old mining districts 
of northern France, once bastions of 
socialism, now the site of Marianne Le 
Pen’s seat.
The British Labour Party is now in 
some respects similar to the various 
populist parties in that because of a 
change in party voting rules which 
allowed participation by a new class 
of ‘supporter’ as well as members 
proper, a rather eccentric left-winger 
was elected as its leader by the 
membership, despite the vehement 
opposition of most of its MPs, backed 
a social movement called Momentum. 
This new leader, Jeremy Corbyn, seems 
to attract almost messianic support from 
many of the new, younger members of 
the party precisely because he is not 
part of the established political elite but 
is an honest, if limited, politician. On 
the other hand as shown in the figures, 
the northern working class appear to 
view him with suspicion as being a 
London smoothy and, despite losing 
seats overall, the Conservatives made 
significant advances in northern seats.
There is an odd, if perverse, similarity 
between Corbyn’s success and that of 
Emmanuelle Macron in France despite 
the fact that in ideological terms they 
are wholly dissimilar. Macron achieved 
a stunning majority of almost 90% 
in Paris in the French Presidential 
elections. His En Marche movement 
achieved similar success in the 
Assembly elections at least inside the 
Périphérique Boulevard which marks 
the administrative boundary of Paris. 
Outside this boundary of ‘official’ 
Paris, in the poorer districts which 
were once called the ‘red belt’ round 
Paris, his vote dropped away and 
France Insoumise won seats though 
the voter turnout dropped down to 
below 30%. In the first round of the 
Presidential election, it was possible to 
walk from the Channel to Switzerland 
along the old, now defunct, coal and 
steel regions of France and from Spain 
to Italy through the départements in 
which the Front National came top 
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even though in the second round, 
Macron decisively beat Le Pen.
Macron like Corbyn attracted 
huge crowds of adoring young voters 
at his rallies. Both are accomplished 
public speakers and able to present 
themselves as outside the normal 
elites of professional politics, even 
though this stretches the record for 
both of them; Macron having been 
Minister of Economy, Industry and 
Digital Affairs in 2014 until 2016 whilst 
Corbyn has been an MP, albeit on the 
backbenches since 1983. Macron’s 
political position is quite different 
to Corbyn’s as he is very much a 
neoliberal wanting to water-down 
much of France protective labour 
law and reduce state benefits whilst 
Corbyn wants much the reverse, being 
essentially a 1970s socialist whose core 
belief is greater state-participation in 
pretty much everything. However both 
have benefited hugely from the social 
category introduced by Goodhart, 
the Anywheres, young graduates who 
have moved to metropolitan areas to 
pursue careers often in the new digital 
sectors whilst Somewheres are less 
well-educated, often older people who 
have stayed near to their birthplace 
and have generally suffered either 
unemployment or stagnation in their 
local economies, often the old coal and 
steel regions.
As illustrated by the huge 
ideological differences between these 
two, any attempt to generalise about 
where Europe is heading is hindered 
by the contradictions within the new 
populism. As Tolstoy wrote in the 
opening sentence of Anna Kerenina: All 
happy families are alike; each unhappy 
family is unhappy in its own way and this 
might be said to apply to the unhappy 
countries of the European Union. 
The social impact of neoliberalism 
compounding its economic impacts has 
produced a range of responses, each in 
their own way pulling apart the political 
structure of European countries but 
each, as Goodhart’s slightly haphazard 
classification illustrates, is pulling in 
rather different directions. 
In eastern Europe, there has been 
a steady increase in the importance 
of right-wing nationalist governments 
which has led in the case of Poland 
to its imposition of controls over the 
press to being questioned within the 
EU. The similar trends in Hungary led 
to the former Belgian Prime Minister 
and prominent current member of 
European Parliament, Guy Verhofstadt, 
taking to Twitter to exclaim “With its 
current policies, Hungary would not 
have been allowed to join the EU in 
2004.” The EU does have the power 
to suspend member states that offend 
against human rights but this draconian 
power has never come even close to 
being implemented. However, the 
refusal of the so-called Visegrad group 
(Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia) to participate in the refugee 
dispersal plan agreed in the summer of 
2015, whereby EU member countries 
would relocate 160,000 refugees 
across the bloc is causing strains. The 
decision is legally binding; however 
Poland and Hungary haven’t taken in a 
single refugee between them, and they 
openly oppose the mandatory nature 
of the scheme. The Czech Republic, 
which holds elections in October, 
took in just 12 last year and none this 
year, with the government saying in 
June that it would withdraw from the 
scheme because of security concerns. 
Slovakia has relocated just 16 refugees 
out of the 902 it was supposed to take. 
The Visegrad Group has relocated 28 
refugees in total out of an allocated 
combined quota of 11,069. It is 
possible that the European Commission 
will take action over this but just what 
form it would take is unclear.
Meanwhile another issue is pulling 
Europe apart: the continuing impact 
of the 2008 financial crisis and the 
austerity programmes imposed on 
many countries. Fig. 2 shows a key 
aspect of this, youth unemployment. 
It might, loosely, be thought that a 
country with more than a quarter of 
its young8 unemployed is slowly dying 
and on this basis, Fig. 2 shows that 
all southern Europe including  France 
cannot survive. Belgium and Slovakia 
also fall into this dismal camp but it is 
noticeable that the other countries of 
northern Europe, broadly, have much 
lower youth unemployment though 
only Germany is below 10% at 6.4% 
and the EU as a whole barely escapes 
below 20%. Comparable figures for the 
USA are 10% and for Japan, 4.9%.
The basis for this deep problem is 
the continuing impact of the 2008 
financial crisis and the inability of 
Europe to pull out of the resulting 
economic depression. One factor in 
this, indeed the focus of the neoliberal 
thinking which still pervades the 
continent, is the high and in many 
cases increasing levels of public debt 
reduction which  characterises the 
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economic mindset of institutions 
such as the European Central Bank 
and, perhaps most important, of the 
German and French governments. In 
his opening speech, the new French 
Premier, Edouard Philippe, made 
it clear that debt reduction would 
form the centrepiece of his economic 
policies, though what he spelt out 
remained just the same-old neoliberal 
nostrums of reducing state expenditure, 
reducing labour controls and lowering 
corporation tax. This fixation remains; 
despite the almost universal opinion 
of independent economists that the 
austerity imposed by debt-reduction 
programmes is actually harmful.
Altogether there are five European 
nations whose debts are larger than 
their GDP, and 21 that have debts 
larger than the 60 per cent-of-GDP 
limit set out in the Maastricht Treaty, 
a limit which is, in principle, legally 
binding, amongst whose number is 
the supposedly virtuous Germany. 
Greece’s public debt is, unsurprisingly, 
the highest in the EU – standing at 177 
per cent of its GDP. Italy and Portugal 
are the next most indebted countries, 
with debts of 132 per cent and 129 
per cent of national economic output 
respectively9, essentially the same bloc 
of countries slowly dying from levels 
of youth unemployment. The two 
others above 100% are Cyprus and 
the one northern European country in 
the group, Belgium. Spain and France 
hover in the high 90s. 
Essentially one can see Europe 
as containing two unstable blocs; a 
group of eastern European states – the 
Visegrad group possibly plus Bulgaria 
and Romania – which have relatively 
low public debt and reasonably stable 
if not prosperous economies, which 
are resolutely opposed to accepting 
any significant numbers of refugees 
and which have nationalist and 
increasingly authoritarian governments. 
These countries have no intention 
of leaving the EU and they receive 
substantial direct financial benefit from 
membership. They are not, however 
in the eurozone apart from Slovakia. 
Then there is a southern bloc including 
Spain, Greece and Italy plus Portugal 
and Cyprus which have large and 
unstable public debts, very high youth 
unemployment and other negative 
economic indicators and have large 
populist political movements. They have 
significant anti-EU social movements. 
One of the key questions is whether 
France should be included in this group. 
All the economic and social indicators 
suggest that it should, particularly as its 
established political parties have been 
destroyed in the recent elections to be 
replaced by the now commonplace 
social movements. On the other hand, 
its newly elected government is firmly 
bound to EU membership.
To these groups, can be added the 
United Kingdom which, of course, has 
added its own brand of instability by 
actually deciding to leave the European 
Union.10 The tortuous negotiations 
leading up to this so-called Brexit 
must be concluded by March, 2019 
and there are no signs that the EU 
negotiators will offer the UK anything 
other than a hard ride. A key reason for 
this is that there is a general fear that 
if the UK appears to be having a soft 
exit, it will spark other moves to leave, 
particularly in Greece and Italy.
The future of Europe and the EU 
hinges around Germany which alone 
of the major EU countries appears 
to have a stable political system and 
a reasonably prosperous economy. 
Despite the incursions of the groups 
like Alternative für Deutschland and 
Pegida, the coalitions of the Christian 
Democrats and the Social Democrats 
with the smaller Green Party and the 
Die Linke (the left party formed by a split 
with the Social Democrats) still hold all 
the seats in the Federal Parliament, the 
Bundestag; and in the most important 
state assemblies they have formed 
stable coalitions. Underpinning this 
political stability is the performance of 
the economy which, notably, runs huge 
and increasing trade surpluses with the 
rest of the world including other EU 
countries. In May, 2017, alone the 
country had a surplus of €22.0 billion 
up from €20.7 billion in May, 2016. 
It is often noted in the southern bloc 
of depressed EU economies that their 
common currency with Germany 
prevents the usual response to running 
trade deficits, currency devaluation, 
whilst Germany benefits worldwide 
from an under-valued euro.
The German government 
now essentially runs the EU with 
its dominance enhanced by the 
election of an enthusiastic poodle, 
Emmanuelle Macron, following behind 
the redoubtable Chancellor, Angela 
Merkel, wagging his neoliberal tail. This 
dominance is best expressed by the 
barely-concealed fact that Germany’s 
Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, 
is the essential arbiter of Greece’s fate 
with his dogged insistence that Greece 
follow an increasingly harsh austerity 
programme if it is to receive any further 
bailout funds, even though nearly all 
economists including the IMF believe 
this approach to be worse than useless. 
The fact is that allowing Greece to 
slowly die protects German interests 
not least in ensuring that loans made to 
Greece, sometimes on a corrupt basis, 
by German institutions are protected.11 
The reassertion of the German-French 
axis which formed the original basis of 
the EU may yet prove the Achilles heel 
for German neoliberalism. If Macron 
fails to do anything about the dire 
state of the French economy and if the 
country descends into riotous semi-
anarchy – the French do good riots – 
then Macron may prove difficult to put 
quietly to sleep. It is also possible that 
in the elections due in September, the 
SPD may become the majority party 
in the Bundestag. The leader of the 
SPD, Martin Schulz, has been critical 
of the failure to assist Greece and is 
likely to campaign on an anti-austerity 
programme similar in some respects 
to the successful Labour campaign in 
Britain in May. According to opinion 
polls, support for the SPD has fallen 
away since early-summer 2017, when 
it came close to the support for the 
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CSU,  but it could recover and leave 
Angela Merkel’s position as Chancellor 
in some doubt and the ‘grand coalition’ 
between the CSU and the SPD 
unstable. On the other hand, there is, 
so far, little sign of the fundamental 
political instability which has beset 
most other EU countries.
So where does this leave the future 
of Europe? Most of the factors noted 
above will continue to fester.
The refugee crisis continues with 
tens of thousands attempting to leave 
Libya mostly for Italy where 93,000 
have arrived in the first half of 2017. 
In addition, to the end of May, 1,244 
refugees were known to have drowned, 
joining Yohanna in unmarked graves.12 
However, the flood of refugees from 
the Middle East via Turkey has been 
stemmed by the EU bribing Turkey with 
some €6 billion in aid plus visa-free 
travel for Turkish citizens. Internal 
borders have been closed so that those 
who have arrived are contained in 
Greece and Italy which have become 
huge holding pens for more than 
hundreds of thousands of migrants, all 
hoping to receive permission to travel 
elsewhere, a process which can take 
years or result in deportation to Turkey. 
These controls may limit the impact of 
immigration in most of the EU though 
Austria recently announced that it may 
deploy its army along its border with 
Italy to stop ‘illegal’ crossing. On the 
other hand, Turkey is now home to as 
many as 3.25 million refugees mostly 
from Syria and it is unclear just how 
long it can contain the pressure of those 
who want to move on to Europe. In 
any event, the sealing of borders both 
around and inside the EU produces 
a kind of existential crisis of fear and 
suspicion which continues to poison 
much of European politics.
The other issue which will certainly 
arise is another financial crisis with 
the euro, similar to that of 2008. The 
European banking sector is still riddled 
with problems particularly in the south. 
Greek banks are essentially broken; 
whilst as recently as June this year, 
the Italian government stepped in to 
wind up two failing lenders, Veneto 
Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza, 
and prevent a bank run, at a total cost 
which could rise to €17bn. This bill will 
be footed by the government despite 
EU rules forbidding this. Meanwhile 
the world’s oldest bank, Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena, is struggling with bad 
debts which, over the entire Italian 
banking sector, are believed to total 
at least €360bn. In Spain, the Banco 
Popular had to be rescued in June by 
a forced sale to the larger Santander 
Bank for €1 whilst Portuguese banks 
are still in the recovery ward.
Even in Germany, the once-mighty 
Deutsche Bank is still suffering from 
falling revenues and low profits after 
it had to recapitalise in 2016 in order 
to survive. It has incurred litigation 
charges of 15 billion euros since 2009 
on extravagant bets and poor conduct 
including the sale of toxic mortgages 
and sham Russian trades and it is still 
involved in litigation over claims of 
alleged sanctions violations.
Financial crises tend to erupt in 
modern capitalism every dozen years 
or so as some unforeseen hiccup 
interrupts the piling up of bad loans 
in asset bubbles. Chinese banks and 
the associated housing bubble is one 
possibility and so is the collapse of the 
UK housing market on the back of the 
flood of low-cost mortgages financing 
a London property boom amidst the 
general chaos of Brexit. Whatever its 
origins, there is little doubt that one 
of its consequences will be another 
crisis in the unstable eurozone with its 
uncorrected level of public debt and 
structural imbalances.
Meanwhile on the western fringe 
of Europe, the UK stumbles along in 
a slow-motion crisis of national and 
regional collapse as the protracted 
negotiations to set the terms of its 
departure from the EU limp towards 
their probable end in March, 2019.
This is all beginning to sound rather 
apocalyptic rather like the opening 
of the fourth seal to reveal a pale 
rider. Many would accept that there 
are troubled times ahead for Europe 
but prefer to believe that we will get 
through by muddling along avoiding 
the worst by settling for second- or even 
third-best. After all, although Trump 
was elected Le Pen was not. Previously I 
quoted our most recent Nobel laureate 
writing in 1967 at the beginning of the 
previous hegemonic crisis that “the 
times they are a’changin’”. This time it 
may more appropriate to quote another 
Nobel laureate, WB Yeats, writing in 
1919 at the beginning of an arguably 
more devastating crisis:
Turning and turning in the widening 
gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot 
hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the 
world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, 
and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is 
drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while 
the worst
Are full of passionate intensity…
And what rough beast, its hour come 
round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be 
born? ■
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There are no 
signs that the EU 
negotiators will offer 
the UK anything other 
than a hard ride. A 
key reason for this is 
that there is a general 
fear that if the UK 
appears to be having a 
soft exit, it will spark 
other moves to leave, 
particularly in Greece 
and Italy.
